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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16232

-vsWALTER PRESTON BOGGESS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by complaint and information
with one count of second degree murder in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury of eight persons
on May 18, 1978.

The Honorable J. Robert Bullock of the

Fourth Judicial District presided.

The jury found appellant

guilty of Qanslaughter and he was sentenced, following a
presentence report, to a term of one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction
and sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the afternoon of March 2, 1978, appellant and
his wife, Ta=y, were sitting across from each other at
their kitchen table

(T. at 22).

Appellant was snoking

a pipe of marijuana (T. at 27), and playing with his
pistol (T. at 22), a single-action .44 magnum caliber
revolver (T. at 41).

He was pointing the gun at various

objects in the room and "dry-firing" it, or causing
gun to operate without anununition (T. at 74).

t~

He had

loaded and unloaded the gun at least once as they were
sitting there
gun.

(T. at 55).

Tammy asked that he unload the

Appellant responded by pointing the gun at his wife

and saying, "it's not loaded," as he fanned it or held the
trigger and caused the hammer to strike.
striking Tammy in the chest (T. at 55).

The gun went ofi·
She later died

from the wound (T. at 87).
The police responded to a telephone call from
appellant and found Tammy nearly dead, lying on the floor
( T. at 18) •

.
th e baby and sobbing
Appel 1 ant was h o ld ing

(T. at 19) •

Later, after being advised of his rights,
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appellant gave several statements (T. at 21 and 54).

He

admitted shooting his wife and that he did not know why he
had shot her.

He said that what he had done was a "Hell

of a way to show it (the gun) was unloaded."

lie further

noted that he should have looked to see if the gun was
loaded but did not (T. at 55-56).

An FBI expert testified

that the victim had been shot from very close range {T.
at 69).
After both sides had rested, appellant's attorney
informed the court in chambers of information he had received
indicating that one of the jurors had stated before the
trial that he would like to "hang appellant for killing his
wife." (T. at 111).

No affidavit or testimony was presented

and defense counsel reserved the right to move for a mistrial
until after the verdict had come in (T. at 112).
The jury was instructed on both second degree murder
and manslaughter (R. at 16-18).

No objections were made to

the jury instructions (T. at 110).

Appellant was found

guilty of manslaughter (R. at 26) and no motion for mistrial
was ever

made.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE BECAUSE
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IS NOT AN INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
Hl\tlSLAUGHTER OR SECOND DEGREE l1URDER, SUCH AN
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT REQUESTED, l\UD THERE HAS NO
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney Law
Library.
Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
EVIDENCE
TO
SUPPORT
A VERDICT
OF NEGLIGENT
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HmncrnE.

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-402(3)

(1953) ' as amended,

defines lesser included offense as when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
sane or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the (greater)
offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
car.unit the offense charged or an-offense
otherwise included therein; or,
(c) It is specifically designated by
statute as a lesser included offense.
Negligent homicide is not specifically designatec
as an included offense of manslaughter,· and neither is it
any form of attempt or preparation to commit homicide sine.
the ultimate end proscribed by both crimes, the death oft
victim, is the same.

If negligent homicide is included

within the crime of manslaughter, it must be so under
subsection (a) of Section 76-1-402 (3).
a codification of preexisting Utah law.

Subsection (a) is
As this Court

noted in State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27
(1962):
The rule as to when one offense is included
in another is that the greater offense includes
a lesser one when establishment of the greater
would necessarily include proof of all of the
elements necessary to prove the lesser.
Conversely, i t is only when the proof of the
lesser offense requires some element not
involved in the greater offense that the lesser
would not be an included offense.
13 Utah 2d at 198.
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It is readily apparent that proof of manslaughter
or second degree murder does not establish proof of the
crime of negligent homicide.

In fact, proof of second

degree murder or manslaughter disproves any possibility of
negligent homicide.
As appellant notes, the major difference in these
crimes is the state of mind required to establish each
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7).

The portion of the second

degree murder statute applicable to this case, subsections
(a),

(b) and (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1)

(1953), as

amended, provide:
(1)
criminal homicide constitutes murder
in the second degree if the actor:
(a)
Intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another; or
(b)
Intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another; or
(c)
Acting under circumstances evidencing
a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engaged in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another.
The requisite mental element may be restated as that the
actor must either intend to cause death or great harm or
that the actor be reckless.
Manslaughter is defined in Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-205 (1953), as amended:
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(1)
Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a)
Recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b)
Causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse;
(c)
Causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a moral
or legal justification or extenuation for
his conduct although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.
Manslaughter thus requires that the actor recklessly kill,
or kill while reasonably disturbed, or with a reasonable
though mistaken

belief that he is justified.

In

t~

latter two instances, the actor intends to cause the deatr.
of the victim but kills because of emotional upset
or mistake.

State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 191f

LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, 1972 § 76; and \qharton's
Criminal Law and Procedure, 1957, Vol. I § 272.
For either of these two er imes, second degree
murder or nanslaughter, the actor must know or intend that
death will result or he must act recklessly.
is defined in Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-103 (3)

Recklessnes:

(1953)' as

amended, as when the actor:
is aware of but consciously
•
·
· f ia
· ble
disregards
a substantial and un)usti
risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur.
The risk must be of
d
·ts disregar
such a nature and d egree t h a t 1
t
ndarc
5
constitutes a gross deviation from the
a ·i"se
ld exerc
··
of care that an ordinary person ":"ou
from the
under all the circumstances as viewed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Fundingstandpoint.
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b

Recklessness requires that the actor be aware of the risk
of his actions but that he ignore the risk.

To establish

second degree murder or manslaughter, then, the state
must prove that the actor knew that death would or might
result and yet acted anyway.
Negligent homicide, however, is defined in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-206

(1953), as amended:

(1)
Criminal homicide constitutes
negligent homicide if the actor, acting
with criminal negligence, causes the
death of another.
Criminal negligence is when the actor:
• • • ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4)

(1953), as amended (emphasis added).

The use of the terms "ought to be aware" and "failure to
perceive" imply that the actor is not in fact aware of the
risk caused by his actions.
Clearly, an actor cannot both know of the risk of
death or intend death as required for second degree murder
or manslaughter, and also not know of the risk, even though
he should, as required for negligent homicide.
m"nlal state inherently disproves the other.

Proof of one
It follows,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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under Brennan, supra, and Section 76-1-402(3), that
negligent homicide is not an included offense of
manslaughter.

a:

In State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d

(1970), this Court outlined when a court must instruct a
jury as to lesser offenses:
One of the foundational principles
in regard to the submission of issues to
the juries is that where the parties so
request they are entitled to have
instructions given upon their theory of
the case; and this includes on lesser
offenses if any reasonable view of the
evidence would support such a verdict.
Id. at 812

(emphasis added).

See also State v. Mitchell,

3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P. 2d 618, 621 (1955).
Initially, it must be noted that appellant raade
no objection to the instructions as they were given to
jury (T. at 110).

As a threshold !'latter,

tr

an appellant

may not claim error in failure to instruct on lesser ofk
unless he requested such instruction, Gillian, supra. I:
this case, however, even if appellant had requested an
instruction on negligent homicide, no reasonable view of
the evidence could have supported such a verdict.
made out negligent homicide, the evidence would have had.
have shown that appellant was unaware that pointing a gu:

·
vervt'·
towards his wife from point blank range and doing e ·

-8-
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mechanically necessary to fire the gun constituted a
risk.

Such naivete in a grown man is unbelievable.

Moreover, appellant indicated that he appreciated the
danger associated with the weapon.

He stated that he

should have looked to see if the gun was unloaded, but
did not (T. at 56, lines 6-7).

He noted that his action

was a "Hell of a way to show it's unloaded"
and 103-104).

(T. at 55

Even though he thought the gun was

unloaded, appellant knew it was dangerous to do what
he did.

No reasonable view of the evidence could lead

to the view that he did not.

The logical conclusion, then,

in light of Gillian, supra, is that the trial court was
correct in not instructing the jury on the elements of
negligent homicide because (a) the instruction was not
requested, and (b) no reasonable view of the evidence
could support a jury verdict of negligent homicide.
Appellant argues that even though an instruction
on negligent homicide was not requested, it was erroneous
for the court to fail to give such an instruction under
State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976)
Brief, pp. 4-5).
offenses.

(Appellant's

Dougherty applies to lesser included

As has been shown, infra,

negligent homicide

is not a lesser included offense of second degree murder
or manslaughter.

Nevertheless, even if it is assumed,

argu~ndo, that negligent homicide was a lesser included
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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offense, there was no error in the court's failure to
instruct on negligent homicide.

A 1 e g't'
i ima t e, recognized

trial tactic is to avoid instruction on lesser included
offenses in hopes of obtaining outright acquittal,
State v. Mitchell, supra at 621.

Moreover, appellant

misreads State v. Dougherty, supra.

In that case, this

Court considered Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 59;

(1966), and stated:
The court discussed three situations in
which the problem of lesser included offensu
are frequently encountered. First, where there
is evidence which would absolve the defendant
from guilt of a greater offense, or degree, b~
would support a finding of guilt of a lesser
offense, or degree; the instruction is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not support
a finding of guilt in the commission of the
lesser offense or degree.
For example, the
defendant denies any complicity in the crime
charged, and thus lays no foundation for any
internediate verd'ict; or where the elements
of the offenses differ, and some element
essential to the lesser offense is either n~
proved or shown not to exist. This second
situation renders an instruction on a leser
included offense erroneous, because it is n~
pertinent.
Third is an intermediate situation. One
· lud•·
where the ' elements of the greater offense inc
all the elements of the lesser offense; because,
by its very nature, the greater offense could. 0
not have been comnitted without defendant.havin,
the intent in doing the acts, which const~tute.
the lesser offense
In such a situation inst'.uc_
tions on the le3se; included offense may be give
because all elements of the lesser of fe~se ~ft
been proved.
However, such an instruction riayt
has me ~
properly
be refused if the prosecu t'on
l
.its burden of proof on t h e grea t e r offense, a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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there is no evidence tending to reduce the
grea~er offen~e.
The court concluded by
stating that if there be any evidence,
however slight, on any reasonab1e theory of
the case under which the defendant rnight be
convicted of.a lesser included offense, the
court must, if requested, give an appropriate
instruction.
(Emphasis added.)
As may be seen, the court is required to instruct the jury
as to a lesser included offense in the absence of a request
to do so only when "there is evidence which would absolve
the defendant from guilt of a greater offense or degree,
but would support a finding of guilt of a lesser offense."
There was no such evidence in this case.

On the contrary,

the evidence clearly indicated that appe1lant knew that
pointing a gun at his wife and "fanning it" constituted an
unreasonable risk.

There· \las no evidence to indicate that

appellant did not know that handling a gun in this manner
was foolish and dangerous.

He may have thought that

he could avoid the possible harm, he may have even thought
he had taken precautions but he still knew that what he did
was a "Hell of a way to show it was not 1oaded."

The

inherent danger in the use of firearms p1us the ever present
possibility that they may not be completedly unloaded make
the act of pointing a gun at someone and pulling the
trigger a substantial and unjustifiable risk even if the
actor thinks the bullets have all been removed.

There was

no evinence to show that appellant did not know of this
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risk.

The trial court did not err in failing to instruct

the jury on negliqent honicide absent a request to do so.
In fact, even if negligent homicide were a lesser includE
offense of second degree murder and/or manslaughter, whic'
it is not, and even if appellant had requested an instruc:
on negligent homicide, which he did not, the trial court
would have been correct in not instructing the jury on
negligent honicide because the evidence sinply would not
have supported such a verdict.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IU FAILING TO DECLAP:
A MISTRIAL SINCE APPELLANT NEVER MOVED TO HAVE A
HISTRIAL DECLARED; NEVER PRESENTED COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT JUROR BIAS EXISTED; AND THE JURY
RETURNED THE LEAST ONEROUS VERDICT POSSIBLE Ill
LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Al though it is true that bias unrevealed in voir
dire in one of the jurors night be grounds for a new tria:
State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 Pac. 356 (1901), thatbii
must be clearly established.
70 Pac. 856

In State v. Hickle, 25 Utah

(1902), the court held that even though

affidavits indicated bias in one of the jurors, theu~v
conflicting affidavits and the verdict was affirmed:
While it is well settled that when, in a
criminal case, a juror has, before his
.
. d'cat1ng
selection, made statements • • • ( in i
iere
prejudgment and bias) and such statements ~
unknown to either the accused or his a~torney
until after the trial, a verdict of guilty
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should, on motion of the accused, if Made in
proper time, be set aside and a new trial
granted • • • (citations omitted) it is also
an equally well settled rule of law that the
verdict of guilty should not be set aside
on ~uch gro~nds except when it is clearly and
satisfactorily made to appear on motion for a
new trial that the juror, previous to his
examination on voir dire, made the prejudicial
statements alleged, and the onus of showing that
fact is upon the accused.
Id. at 848

(emphasis added).

In a more recent case, this Court has noted:
our major concern in this, as in
any case, is with the lawfulness and justice
of a conviction; and notwithstanding a showing
of minor impropriety or irregularity, there
should be no reversal of a conviction unless
it appears that a party has been prejudiced in
that in the absence of such impropriety there
is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict
would have been different.
State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977).
In the instant matter, a motion for a mistrial was
never made.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3 (1953), as amended,

provides:
When a verdict or decision has been
rendered against the defendant the court
may, upon his aoplication, grant a new
trial. • • •
(Emphasis added.)
There was no duty for the trial court to declare a
mistrial, sua sponte.

Appellant's attorney reserved the

right to move for a mistrial following the return of the
verdict but never so moved (T. at 112).

The only evidence

before the court indicating the possibility of juror bias
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

was some double hearsay submitted by appellant's attorney
(T. at 111).

No affidavits were ever submitted, nor was

any testimony heard.

One could hardly say that appellant

had met his burden of establishing bias.
Even if the bias is admitted, however, appellant
was not harmed by it.

Whether appellant had actually

killed his wife was not at issue.

VirtuallY all of

appellant's actions were established or
by his own testimony.

substantiat~

Given the nature of the act (see

Point I, infra), the only question for the jury was whetlle
appellant had the mental state required for second degree
murder or manslaughter.

The unanimous jury verdict was

that he had only acted recklessly, not intentional~. U
the bias was present, it was overcome since the verdict oi
guilty of manslaughter was the least onerous verdict thH
could reasonably have arrived at.
Appellant never sought a mistrial nor presented
competent evidence concerning juror bias.
possible verdict was returned by the jury.

The lightest
There was no

error in the court's failure to declare a mistrial

00

W

own motion.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS llOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL.
.
.
•rurner,
This Court has enunciated in Alires v . .:-=-----Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969), the test to be utilized
whenever the question of ineffective counsel is raised.
In Alires, supra, the Court first stated that " • • • we
do not reverse for mere error or irregularity, but only
where it is substantial and prejudicial."

Id. at 120.

The Court then stated that the right of an
accused to counsel is included in the concept of due
process of law, embodied as it is in the United States
and Utah Constitutions.

The requirement of counsel, said

the Court:
is not satisfied by a sham or
pretense of an appearance in the record by
an attorney who manifests no real concern
about the interests of the accused.
Id. at 121.
Inunediately following the above quoted sentence,
the Court turns its attention to the standard required by
due process to be applied to appointed counsel:
The entitlement is to the assistance of a
competent member of the Bar, who shows a
willingness to identify himself with the
interests of the defendant and present such
defenses as are available to him under the
law and consistent with the ethics of the
profession.
~· at 121.

This standard has been consistently reaffirmed.
See Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970);
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Kryger v. Turner,

25 Utah 2d 214,

State v. r1cNicol,

554 P.2d 203

479 P.2d 480 (1971);

(Utah 1976).

In the instant matter, appellant contends that
he was denied effective counsel because of three errors:
(1) failure to present a negligent homicide theory
case,

(2)

~ ~

failure to move for a mistrial, and (3) failuro

to perfect a timely appeal

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13),

As has been noted, a legitimate, recognized tac::
of defense counsel is to avoid instruction on lesser offE;
in hopes of obtaining outright acgui ttal, State v. flitchE:
supra at 621.

Negligent homicide is not an included offer

of second degree r:mrder or rnanslaughter and the evidence:
this case simply would not reasonably have supported a
negligent hornicide verdict.

Appellant's attorney is helc

under Alires, supra, to present only legitimate argument;,
The failure to argue negligent hornicide in this case was
certainly not violative of that standard.
The failure to rnove for a mistrial is also not
error, prejudicial or otherwise.

The verdict of thej~

was as favorable as could have been hoped for, given the
evidence in the case.

Even if the rnotion for a mistrial

been made and successfully supported by the necessacy
.
af f idavits,
it is highly unlikely that at_)pellant could e·
·
· t
receive
a less burdensome ver d ic

fro~."' an''" other J'ury.
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1

admitted shooting his wife (T. at 55 and 57).
that his act was a fooolish risk (T. at 55-56).

He adMitted
The fact

that the jurc' found him guilty of the lesser of the offenses
charged was as good as he could have hoped for.

It would

have been a r,istake for his attorney to have moved for a
mistrial following such a verdict.
Finally, although it may have been improper for
appellant's attorney to have failed to file a timely appeal,
the fact that the court is considering the instant appeal
demonstrates the lack of prejudice to the appellant.
over, there

~ere

More-

no issues of merit to be considered in an

appeal.
Appellant's attorney at trial was active and involved.
He participated in vigorous cross-examination of the state's
witnesses and successfuly convinced the jury that his client
was not guilty of the greater offense of second degree murder.
Although he did recognize the impropriety of having a biased
juror, he also wisely chose to not disturb a relatively
favorable ju~? verdict.

He did not fail to provide appellant

with effective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
Negligent homicide is not an included offense of
manslaughter or second degree murder.

The court was not

requested to instruct the jury as to negligent homicide and
f~ilu1e to do so in any event was not error since the
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evidence of the case could not have reasonably supported
such a verdict.
Appellant never moved for a mistrial because of
juror bias nor was competent evidence ever produced
demonstrating such bias.

In any event, the jury returned

the least onerous verdict reasonably possible under the
evidence indicating that if any bias existed, it was
overcome.
Appellant was not denied effective

assistan~cl

counsel since his attorney actively participated in his
defense and successfully convinced the jury that appellant
was guilty of a lesser offense than that charged, even
though appellant admitted killing his wife.
Respondent consequently urges this Court to sus
the conviction and sentence of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B.

HANSEN

Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney Gen
Attorneys for Respondent
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Affidavit 't1as filed with the Clerk of the District Court,
but due to the fact that the Affidavit still bore the
Circuit Court number,

it did not get into the District Court

file and was unavailable to Judge Taylor at the time the
case came on for hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment.
On the day set for hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment,
an agreement was reached between the attorney for Plaintiff
and attorney for Defendant, based on the fact that the
attorney for Defendant had a conflict in that he had to
appear at a trial

in the case of Paris Company v. Hans

Siebold at the same time the Motion for Summary Judgment
was to be heard before Judge Taylor.

It was agreed by both

attorneys that due to the conflict, the matter of the hearing
on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment could be
The Law and Motion Division of the District

continued.

Court, acting through Judge Taylor, notwithstanding a request
by an associate of Plaintiff's attorney, proceeded to render
judgment against Defendant on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The judgment was rendered by Judge Taylor without

having before him Defendant's Affidavit in opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion and without Defendant being afforded the
opportunity to be represented and present matters in defense
of her case.
After being advised of Judge Taylor's action and
· ·
rece1v1ng
t h e Or d er prepare d b Y the attorney for Plaintiff,
Defendant's attorney ascertained that the Affidavit of
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to vacat<

1

Defendant's attorney's schedule and the abuse of discretion
on the part of the lower court in refusing to grant a
continuance, even though both parties to the action,

through

their attorneys had agreed that the matter might be continued.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case for the purposes of this appeal
have been Summarized above in the Na tu re of the Case and
Disposition of Case in Lower Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
1.

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IT'S ACTION IN

DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT, WHICH JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON A HEARING UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO BE
REPRESENTED BY HER COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO

PRESE~T

MATTERS

IN HER DEFENSE.
The principle applied by this court in the case of
Griffith v.

Hammon,

Utah

, 560 P2d 1375, (1977),

is applicable to the instant case.
trial court erred

This court held that the

in not setting aside a default judgment

entered '"here the Defendants failed to appear at the trial
and where

the Defendants had properly objected to the trial

date based upon their counse I's

i nab i Ii ty to appear because
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and pub I i c con v en i enc e , and the Supreme Court
on appeal will reverse the trial court only
where abuse of such discretion is clearly
shown. 11
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"(The trial court) cannot act arbitrarily and
should be generally indulgent toward permitting
full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so that
they can be settled advisedly and in conformity
with law and justice."
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I

.............

The court further stated that,
"It is ordinarily an abuse of discretion to
refuse to vacate a default judgment where
there is reasonable justification or excuse
for fa i l u re to appear and t i me l y a pp l i cat i 0 n
is made to set it aside."
It

is submitted by Appellant that the principles

recited above are persuasive in support of Appellant's
contention that the lower court erred in denying Appellant's
Motion to Vacate the judgment which was granted as a result
of a hearing where Defendant was unable to be present or be
represented by her counsel.

POINT I I
2.

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WHEREIN AT
THE HEARING ON SAID MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT
DID NOT HAVE BEFORE IT, DUE TO CLERICAL ERROR, THE AFFIDAVIT
OF THE DEFENDANT WHICH WAS SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
With regards to Point II, Appellant respectfully
invites this Court's attention to the Affidavit of counsel
for Appellant dated December 8, 1978, wherein the facts
surrounding the absence of Appel ]ant's counter affidavit to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment are recited and it
is pointed out
have

in the Affidavit t~at the lower court did not

it's counter affidavit for it at the time the hearing
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C'

stipulation of both parties, but that Judge Taylor refused
the request and proceeded to render judgment against
Defendant on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
notwi tnstanding said request.

It is submitted that such

action on the part of Judge Taylor was an abuse of discretion
and should have formed the basis of the granting of Defendant's
Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment rendered as a result
of the hearing on October 27, 1978.
For the reasons set forth above,

it is respectfully

urged that the action of the lower court in denying
Appellant's Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment granted as
a result of the hearing of October 27, 1978, was error such
as to require the reversal of said order and the rendition
of an order by this Court which has the effect of allowing
Appellant to present her defense to Plaintiff's case in the
lower court.

STEP EN L. JO NS ON
431 South Thir East
Salt Lake City, Utah

8411 0

Attorney for Appellant
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